Document Library

This document describes the process by which a decision-making tool was created for use in network-level railway track management scenarios.

For the New Jersey DOT, a culvert information management system was developed. This document details its development and its purposes.

This report contains methods for integrating environmental considerations into pavement and asset management for sustainability.

Data on distress levels within Ontario, Canada's road network, and suggested guidelines for condition improvement.

A project to integrate socioeconomic influences into the development of a framework for the management of rural roads in developing countries.

A case study that compares various methods for evaluating pavement interventions.

This 2009 Austroads report details an approach to understanding and evaluating the impacts of changes in vehicle fleet usage of road pavement. The report evaluates the physical and economic effects of increased traffic of high productivity vehicles (HPV), and provides information on analytical tools and modeling of changing fleet usage scenarios.

Drivers can experience different centerline levels of retroreflectivity in each travel direction. Paint pavement marking retroreflectivity in one direction may meet minimum requirements, while it does not in the other direction. This paper investigates the retroreflectivity directionality property of paint pavement markings to find the relationship between retroreflectivity values and the paint installation direction, to quantify these differences and to determine whether retroreflectivity directionality could have an impact on paint markings meeting the pending Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) minimum retroreflectivity levels. Data on yellow centerline retroreflectivity for two-lane highways were collected, taking measurements in two directions. A paired t test on the data shows that there are statistically significant differences. A field study investigated the relationship between the direction the marking is painted and the retroreflectivity direction. Results show that paint centerline retroreflectivity values measured in the direction of paint striping are significantly higher than values measured in the opposite direction. Findings indicate that the lower retroreflectivity values of yellow centerlines (measured in the opposite direction from paint striping) should be used when determining if it meets the newly proposed FHWA minimum standard because the drivers in that direction experience lower marking retroreflectivity at night.

In response to minimum retroreflectivity standards, transportation departments are implementing sign asset management strategies, which rely upon knowledge of how retroreflectivity decreases as signs weather and age. To provide this knowledge, the writers field measured over 1,000 in-service signs in scattered NC Department of Transportation (NCDOT) divisions, collecting age and retroreflectivity data for white, yellow, red, and green signs and for ASTM sheeting Types I and III. Data from this study and data from five similar U.S. efforts were analyzed using regression to identify the best available deterioration rate estimates, finding that retroreflectivity minimums are usually reached eight to 15 years after installation. Initial results indicated that the best-fitting relationships between retroreflectivity and age were generally linear and that these models were significant despite having low R2 values. Because age did not explain some of the variance, the writers reevaluated their data including NCDOT divisions as a factor, finding that sign deterioration differed significantly by division, indicating that handling practices, manufacturing differences, and environmental exposure may be key deterioration model factors that merit future study.

This study addresses the development of a sampling protocol for condition assessment of selected assets in the state of Maryland. The proposed sampling protocol targets a desired precision and level of confidence in the estimates of levels of service (LOS) for individual assets at each maintenance shop. This work includes the evaluation of the effect of sample size [i.e., number of 0.8 km (1/2 mi.) roadway sections] on the accuracy of estimates of LOS. The distribution of sample sizes among the various maintenance shops accounts for factors such as roadway functional classification, average annual daily traffic, geographical location, the approximate distribution of assets, and the variability in estimates of LOS for each individual asset. The implementation of the proposed sampling protocol will allow maintenance personnel to make reasonable inferences regarding the condition level of the entire asset population. This information will be useful to prioritize areas of need and determine levels of funding, personnel, and equipment. Three different variations of the proposed sampling protocol are evaluated. These variations are a function of how sample sizes are calculated: Option 1, sample size based on the asset with the largest number of required samples; Option 2, sample size based on the asset with the largest number of required samples from a selected group of assets; and Option 3, sample size based on the average number of required samples for all assets. It was concluded that, for a given confidence level, if a minimum precision is to be met for all assets, Option 1 should be used. However, if the sample size is to be limited and a minimum precision is to be met only for a selected group of assets, then Option 2 would be the best alternative. The framework proposed in this study can be modified so that it can be applied to other geographical regions.

Presentation updated for the Delaware and Maryland T2 center's Asset Management Conference 11/5/09.

Protecting the critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) of the United States is essential to the Nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life. Attacks on CI/KR could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of the incident. Direct terrorist attacks and natural, manmade, or technological hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property destruction, and economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and confidence. Attacks using components of the Nation’s CI/KR as weapons of mass destruction could have even more devastating physical and psychological consequences. The overarching goal of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is to: Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the Nation’s CI/KR to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. The NIPP provides the unifying structure for the integration of existing and future CI/KR protection efforts into a single national program to achieve this goal. Protection includes actions to mitigate the overall risk to CI/KR assets, systems, networks, functions, or their inter-connecting links resulting from exposure, injury, destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation. In the context of the NIPP, this includes actions to deter the threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize consequences associated with a terrorist attack or other incident. Protection can include a wide range of activities, such as hardening facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance into initial facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security systems, leveraging “self-healing” technologies, promoting workforce surety programs, and implementing cyber security measures, training and exercises, business continuity planning, and restoration and recovery actions, among various others. Achieving the NIPP goal requires actions to address a series of objectives that include: (1) Understanding and sharing information about terrorist threats and other hazards; (2) Building security partnerships to share information and implement CI/KR protection programs; (3) Implementing a long-term risk management program; and (4) Maximizing efficient use of resources for CI/KR protection, restoration, and recovery. These objectives require a collaborative partnership between and among a diverse set of security partners, including the Federal Government; State, Territorial, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; international entities; and nongovernmental organizations. The NIPP provides the framework that defines the processes and mechanisms that these security partners will use to develop and implement the national program to protect CI/KR across all sectors over the long term.